Introduction
C ontemporary intervention processes involving largescale ecosystem transformation have major redistributive effects. In the case of mega-hydraulic projects and large-scale river diversion schemes, these impacts are usually to the advantage of powerful stakeholders outside the project area (such as mega-cities and industries) and mostly to the disadvantage of the vulnerable groups in the affected river basin territory (McCully 2001; Moore, Dore, and Gyawali 2010; Sneddon and Fox 2008; WCD 2000) . Development of hydropower plants is an important driver of such transformations, and the case of Hidrosogamoso in the Department of Santander in northeast Colombia is illustrative. Construction of the hydropower plant in the Sogamoso River started in 2009 and was finished at the end of 2014. At the moment, the dam inundates an area of thousands of hectares, affecting a large number of communities and the territory-based livelihoods of many people (Roa-Avendaño and Duarte- Abadía 2012) .
The project received strong support from international institutions, the national government, and the private sector, which used arguments of overall public interest, "clean" energy, the environment, and the national economy to legitimize it. Support for the project implies a prioritization of high-value urban electricity over the water needs of fishermen and peasant subsistence agriculture. However, project plans claim that the hydropower plant's so-called non-consumptive water use is not competing with the diverse consumptive and livelihood-based water uses of the territory's stakeholders (DNP 2007) .
In Sogamoso, this claim is contested by local residents. They are confronted with the re-patterning of their existing hydrosocial networks and profound changes in the ecosystems on which their livelihoods depend. Experiences to date show how some collective land and water user groups have been forced to privatize and sell their properties while other properties were outright expropriated. In Colombia, constitutional and legal norms for building infrastructure projects in indigenous and community territories require agreements between companies, the Government, and the people affected. The Sogamoso basin experience, however, seems to indicate that the interplay of negotiations is significantly asymmetrical. Values placed on territories are different for the diverse parties and often incommensurable (see also Escobar 2011; Martinez-Allier 2002) . Socioenvironmental conflicts have been growing since the early phases of hydroelectric construction, while deterritorialization profoundly challenges the local social fabric.
This article examines the profound alterations in the existing human-nature interactions triggered by Hidrosogamoso hydropower development and analyzes the impact and effects of such changes in the local, socionatural territory, conceptualized as a hydrosocial network intersecting biophysical, ecological, sociocultural, and political-economic domains. 2 The section below reviews the broader debate and conceptual background of hydropower and large dam interventions that trigger the profound socioecological transformation of hydrosocial territories. It also proposes a conceptual framework for analyzing water conflicts in terms of struggles over resources, norms, authority, and discourses. The third section describes the reconfiguration of the territory that is affected, and the fourth analyzes the socioenvironmental conflicts that emerge as a result of changing control over water in the river basin. It examines how the negotiation strategies used by the Electrical Interconnection Company (ISA, currently known as ISAGEN, a government-owned company with private shareholders under the control of the Ministry of Mines and Energy), weaken and fend off any political action by affected communities to defend their territory-based livelihoods. The fifth section presents the responses by affected groups and their support networks and analyzes how the capacity to decide about territorial reaccommodation and control over water is significantly geared toward serving the Company's interests. We conclude that mega-hydropower projects (such as the one in the Sogamoso basin), presented as a symbol of progress and modernity under the powerful discourse of globalizing development, profoundly undermine existing livelihood practices and hydrosocial territoriality in order to re-pattern humans, hydraulics, and nature in a dominant, externally driven, hydro-political network hierarchy. They produce and legitimize structural violence, in which political debate, local ecological-cultural values, and alternative human-nature worldviews regarding the river's life cycle, are delegitimized and made invisible.
Hydropower and the (Re)patterning of Hydrosocial Territories Large Dam Development and the Revival of Hydropower
In the last decades, the development of hydropower and large hydraulic infrastructure has become an increasingly controversial issue, generating intense disputes between proponents and protesters and triggering broad societal struggle. Building large-scale water infrastructure has proven to have huge social and environmental impacts, whereby burdens and benefits are unevenly distributed among different social groups, regions, and scales (McCully 2001; Molle and Floch 2008; WCD 2000) . Large dams grossly change hydrological regimes and tend to irreversibly alter local community livelihoods. Often, in many places around the world, hydropower projects result in dispossession, expropriation, or resettlement without compensation (see Cernea 1999; Steiner 2010) .
Large-scale interventions in hydrological regimes have received growing scholarly and public critique, as embodiments of mono-disciplinary, top-down, and supply-side water resources development. However, more recently, their worldwide planning has gained a new impetus through their representation as important ingredients of the new "green economy" (Sneddon and Fox 2008; Swyngedouw 2014) . Hydropower generation is currently a key justification for large dam projects, supported by the discourses of clean development and climate change control. New mega-works, however, often ignore the lessons of past decades, while disregarding their own contribution to climate change (Jasanoff 2010; Moore, Dore, and Gyawali 2010) . A continuing controversy relates to how new mega-hydraulic projects prioritize industrial and large urban interests over those of indigenous territories, peasant livelihoods, and local food security issues.
It seems that the iron triangles of state bureaucracies, politicians, and engineering schools-in interaction with private companies-are a decisive factor in preferring largescale hydraulic works over more context-adapted, interactive, and less expensive alternatives. Large hydropower facilities, indeed, are normally embedded in powerful hydrosocial networks (Boelens and Post Uiterweer 2013; Molle, Mollinga, and Wester 2009; Swyngedouw 2014) . Entwining political and economic power, they strategically deploy the globalizing discourse of water scarcity, efficiency, rational planning, and national progress to legitimize their plans, sidelining proposals with less socioenvironmental impact and more support for local socioeconomic development and cultural practice.
Society-Nature-Technology Interaction and the Reconfiguration of Hydrosocial Territories
Territorial places such as the Sogamoso basin, commonly presented as natural environments, are actively constructed and historically produced "sociophysical realities" or "waterscapes" (Swyngedouw 2007 (Swyngedouw , 2014 . They are the outcomes of socioenvironmental interaction processes. The boundaries between nature and society, besides exposing "actual reality," are the products of human imagination and social and scientific agreements (e.g., White 1995) . Political ecology and Science and Technology Studies have argued how these socionatural (hydrosocial) networks, entwining the social, the biophysical, and the technological, are constituted (see, e.g., Latour 1993; Swyngedouw 2007) . Water flows, water use systems, hydrological cycles, etc., and their linkages at micro, meso, and macro scales, are mediated by power relations and human intervention, thereby constituting new hydrogeographies (see, e.g., Bakker 2010; Budds 2009; Swyngedouw 2014; Whatmore 2002) . "Hydrosocial territory" refers to:
The contested imaginary and socioenvironmental materialization of a spatial, multi-scalar network in which humans, water flows, ecological relations, hydraulic infrastructure, financial means, legal-administrative arrangements, and cultural institutions and practices are interactively defined, aligned, and mobilized through epistemological belief systems, political hierarchies, and naturalizing regimes of representation. (Boelens et al. n.d.) Given its contested cultural and political nature (see Hoogesteger, Boelens, and Baud n.d.; Saldías et al. 2012; Seemann n.d.) , the question of how the boundaries between nature and society are conceptualized, how the interlinkages among particular natural, social, and technological elements are established to pattern hydrosocial networks, by which actors and with what interests and consequences, is fundamental (McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Robbins 2004; Swyngedouw 2014) . By de-patterning existing water territories and hydrosocial networks and re-patterning them in particular ways through new alliances among humans and non-humans, hydropower and large dam projects induce development and marginalization, and benefits and burdens, in differential ways for different groups of people (Zwarteveen and Boelens 2014) . Dominant hydroelectric powers often tend to obscure this "man-made," political construction of socionatures, for instance, through the naturalization of rivers, hydrological cycles, and even water distribution systems. Denying water's "humanized nature" (see Boelens et al. n.d.; Mosse 2008; White 1995) and locating the latter in the realm of (purified) nature (Latour 1993) , of natural laws, and of naturally best solutions is a common strategy to depoliticize water questions that deeply influence politics and decision making (Zwarteveen and Boelens 2014 ; see also Swyngedouw 2014) . In other words, water flows actively shape, connect, invigorate, destroy, and mediate society and nature, and they are also a deeply contested resource steered by politics (Kaika 2006; Swyngedouw 2007 Swyngedouw , 2014 . Therefore, understanding how river basin configuration and hydropower development are based on socionatural politics provides opportunities to critically scrutinize the power-laden contents of dominant hydrosocial regimes and networks.
To examine the water conflict in the Sogamoso basin, we use the Echelons of Rights Analysis (ERA) (e.g. Boelens 2009; Zwarteveen and Boelens 2014) . It distinguishes four interlinked echelons, associated with the levels at which contestation over water occurs. The first echelon, involving the domain of resources (e.g., water, land, labor) and technologies, looks at conflicting interests regarding water flows and patterns of use and access, commonly mediated by technologies (e.g., hydraulic infrastructure). It therefore relates to conflicts over how water access-in terms of quantity, quality, and timeliness-needs to be patterned among societal and ecological uses and user groups. The second echelon considers conflicts over the norms and rules defining water allocation, contamination, and water-related risks. It highlights the dynamics of water rights and claimmaking powers, illuminating how diverging norms, rules, laws, and policy regulations conflict in the water arena. The third echelon regards the question of who has the authority and legitimacy to define the rules and norms of water allocation, contamination, and risk. Here, we see a diversity of competing values and decision stakes and a multitude of interest groups with different views and frameworks of interpretation. The third echelon focuses on power, legitimacy, scales of water governance, and how water decision making among diverse groups is organized. Finally, the fourth echelon deals with the conflicting discourses and worldviews for justifying or articulating particular water realities and policies. This echelon links the foregoing ones and enables the critical analysis of conflicting water policies, theories, and models. It reveals how discourses are strategically used to contest particular allocations of water.
The Cultural Politics of Violence and Dispossession
The interlinked echelons demonstrate that both overt conflicts and encounters and, importantly, the underlying societal contradictions deeply structure, energize, and color the tensions that manifest above and beneath the surface. As Galtung (1990) explains, these contradictions are ingrained in the structure of class domination and political-economic inequality and are the foundation of structural violence (or as Zizek [2009] (re)conceptualized it: "systemic violence"). Structural/systemic violence connects in a triangular way to direct violence (based on attitudes) and cultural violence (particularly along lines of ethnicity, race, and gender). In Latin America and in countries such as Colombia in particular, capitalist accumulation and dispossession are profoundly ethnicized and racialized, and moreover, the conflict is deeply determined by para-military violence (e.g. Rosero 2007) . Together, the forms of violence find permanent backing through discursive violence, or the creation and reproduction of a world of meaning that is taken for granted. In many different configurations, these forms of violence entwine and are naturalized: they become the "normal state of being" (Foucault 1982 (Foucault , 2007 Zizek 2009 ).
Pécaut (2000) and Oslender (2008) , among others, elaborate on how these "geographies of terror" are constituted and normalized in the case of Colombia, with strong support and complicity across multiple layers of government, national elites, and transnational companies. Rodríguez-Garavito and Orduz-Salinas (2012) and Vélez-Torres (2012) , among others, show how these forms of class-based, ethinicized, and racialized violence and dispossession are importantly linked to hydropower development in Colombia. In exemplary cases politics of disciplining and cultural categorization (superior/inferior) are deployed. In other words, cultural politics deeply color the contestations that take place within each of the four Echelons of Rights (that is, in terms of distributing fundamental resources; setting the rules, rights, and obligations; sanctioning the culturally appropriate forms of authority and decision making; and naturalizing particular worldviews). Politics of cultural disciplining aim to generate values, beliefs, and behaviors that provide legitimacy to dominant water policies and unequal resource distribution practices. In practice, however, subaltern water user groups and communities employ strategies of deviance and resistance to counteract these politics. Before examining how water conflicts unfold within the four echelons, we present an outline of territorial change under the Hidrosogamoso hydropower development.
Hidrosogamoso: Deterritorialization and the Reconfiguration of a New Water Territory
Colombia, like most countries on the continent, is racing headlong to promote the extraction-export model in the quest for economic growth. Under neoliberalism the country has laid the legal and institutional foundations to protect and institutionalize large national and transnational companies' rights. It aims to attract foreign investors by providing them with natural resources, subsidies, and large amounts of energy (see Baud, de Castro, and Hogenboom 2011; Roa-Avendaño and Duarte-Abadía 2013; Svampa 2011) . Accordingly, numerous hydroelectric projects have emerged, since petroleum reserves are running dry, and fuel prices are escalating.
The Hidrosogamoso project is illustrative of these largescale developments. It was planned in the 1970s but was more recently revived when financial and political conditions to construct and operate it developed. The dam, owned by ISAGEN, is part of an array of projects in the mid-basin of the Magdalena River, with both national and international economic stakeholders.
3 The project, with a projected hydropower generation capacity of 820 megawatts, aims to cover 10 percent of the national energy demand and export electrical energy to neighboring countries. The hydraulic mega-project activities of Hidrosogamoso are located in the Department of Santander, in the canyon where the Sogamoso River crosses the La Paz Mountains, down to the Magdalena River, forming an extensive alluvial zone that floods during the rainy season (see Map 1).
For centuries, fishing people, landless rural villagers, and settler farmers have taken advantage of the regular flooding in the lower basin of the Sogamoso. Historically, they established complex networks of food exchanges with indigenous communities. More recently, they have traded with local communities settled in the Yariguies mountains, the upper basin, and toward the wetlands and surrounding areas, following this "amphibian rhythm." That is, local population groups strategically use the river and swamps intermittently, depending on the time of year (Baleta 2005; Fals Borda 2002) . Historically, the wealth of fish in the Sogamoso lower river and its wetlands enabled fishing-based livelihoods: since the end of the 19th century, people from diverse regions have resettled in the alluvial plains because the river ecosystems (gallery forests, broad beaches, islets, and wetlands) provided livelihood opportunities for those who came to escape from war and hunger (Archila 2006) .
The Hidrosogamoso dam is 190 m high, with a storage capacity of 4,800 millions of cubic metters. Currently, by damming the waters of the Sogamoso River, the hydropower project is flooding an area of 7,000 ha upstream, affecting the eight municipalities where the Sogamoso empties into the Magdalena River: Girón, Betulia, Zapatoca, Los Santos, Villanueva, Barichara, San Vicente de Chucurí, and Lebrija. Although Girón loses the most land to the project with 32 percent of its total area flooded, Betulia will be the municipality most impacted because the project is dividing it into two parts (Novoa, Pardo, and Rico 2011) . According to official data, 900 families dependent on agriculture and fishing will be affected. In addition to the reservoir-flooded area, ISA-GEN requires another 3,500 ha for project construction and conservation activities, so a total of 10,500 ha will be under ISAGEN control. And, according to Executive Resolution 230 (2008) which declares public domain over the land required to construct the project, the formally established project area is nearly 21,420 ha, triple the flooded area (Novoa, Pardo, and Rico 2011; Roa-Avendaño and Duarte-Abadía 2012) .
Besides these legally condoned land acquisitions, as detailed below, ISAGEN and its allies also used extralegal mechanisms to gain land control (e.g., financial co-option of leaders) and, additionally, villagers mention many illegal practices, such as corrupting officials, use of violence, and de facto territorial occupations by flooding and dispossession of common lands (Roa-Avendaño and Duarte-Abadía 2012). Existing territories along the Sogamoso River are deeply de-patterned through the newly introduced social and power relationships, and re-patterned according to a new hydropower-based configuration (see also Mançano 2009 ). The hydropower socionatural network actively deterritorializes existing ways of life, creating boundaries around people's previously held customary rights and severely limiting their access to the aquatic ecosystems' subsistence resources (Roa-Avendaño 2010). Construction of Hidrosogamoso will give ISAGEN control over local communities' water: it changes the seasonality of flooding and non-flooding of their land and enforces a radical change in ownership because of the appropriation, use, and management of this land by powerful third-party sectors. Water is accumulated or dammed up, first of all, to generate energy. Then other fields of domination come, one after the other, such as industrial fishing, commercial tourism projects, and control over allocation of water for agriculture, drinking water supply, and other productive activities. In short, this is a form of "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey 2003) : capitalist hydropower development intensifies the number of people excluded from their territories, obliging them to abandon their biodiversity-based livelihoods. Dispossession of water needs to be understood beyond simply the accumulation of the liquid water: it entails a wholesale of transformation of nature-society water dynamics. Now, five years after beginning construction on the hydropower project, the river's transformed hydrological regime has generated important changes in the quality and quantity of water flows. Water quality is affected by five factors: first, geochemicals are released from rocks during dynamiting to build tunnels and the dam wall. Second, the capacity to regulate and ecologically filter the water is lost by damming the water and increasing the rate of deforestation in the La Paz mountains. The latter also increases the occurrence of natural disasters during extreme flows. 4 Third, non-organic building materials and sewage from camps pollute the area. Fourth, geomorphological changes in the riparian ecosystem of the basin destabilize the slopes during project construction. And fifth, high migration into the zone increases the demand for water and the dumping of solid and liquid wastes. Just as important are the water quantity problems that result from deviating the river and damming its water. All these environmental transformations have a deep, negative impact on the livelihoods of the people who depend directly on the river for fishing, small-scale mining, and subsistence agriculture.
On the one hand, their food sovereignty is threatened by the high, uncontrolled death of fish. Currently, fish have become scarce in the region while the remaining fish may be too contaminated to eat. In the Llanito wetlands, community leaders affirm that fishing activity is reduced by 70 percent: over 20 tons will no longer be sold, affecting 1,200 fishers (Gamarra and Suárez 2011) . On the other hand, fishers, women who sell fish, and small farmers have been displaced by the project, and their activities have been prohibited or restricted. This has eliminated the people's food security and autonomy, making their livelihoods increasingly dependent on the outside market. Fishers are kept out of fishing areas while shops have increased product sales and prices; further, destruction of the dry parts of rivers (beaches and dunes) prevents planting of subsistence crops. So, at the same time that the cost of living (rent, services, food) rose sharply in the zone around the hydroelectric construction, residents have lost access to their livelihoods. Similarly, people living downstream from the worksite have no water supply and have to drink water directly from the river and nearby gullies. Many residents who lost their livelihoods now offer cheap labor for the operating companies and contractors; the women seek alternative income sources or depend on their children or husbands who work for the company.
These socioecological impacts, generated in the first phase of construction, are kept quiet by offering alternative development proposals, to be pursued by the hydroelectric company after construction is completed. Most of these proposals involve transforming the Sogamoso River into a tourist asset. In the wetlands, commercial fishing is already largely replacing local families' subsistence-based fishing practice. Rather than addressing the impacts generated by the dam on water security, food sovereignty, and self-esteem, people are induced to participate in new, externally constituted social institutions, in which local water flows are governed by market dynamics. This implies a break in socioecological interactions grounded in a cultural legacy and local production of the knowledge necessary to maintain equilibrium in riparian ecosystems. Instead, people's social insecurity becomes more intense. In the words of a village leader, "It is clear to see that this changed our lives, but for the worse. They promised us work, but then they hired contractors. … For instance, we have our communal neighborhood aqueduct, but now they are building a municipal aqueduct, to charge us more and make us beg for water" (personal communication, July 2011).
Despite ISAGEN project statements, people lack the opportunities to prevent risk in relation to hydropower development impacts. In general, people are uninformed of their rights, and the Company takes advantage of this situation. The alternative "social inclusion projects," in everyday practice, appear to be a means to exclude the riverside population from the newly established patterns of appropriating natural assets within the new territory.
Conflicting Interests and Negotiations over Hydrosocial Patterning
We use the four levels of water conflict analysis (developed in the ERA) to examine the negotiation strategies defining the new water control and management patterns in the Sogamoso basin. To understand the dynamics of water conflicts, we focus on the struggle over the redistribution of natural assets and resources; over the contents of rules, rights, and regulations; over the legitimate authority to establish those rules and institutions; as well as the different discourses that orient human behavior and sustain (or challenge) water development policies, regulation, and particular authority. Struggles over the fourth echelon, of conflicting discourses, aim to coherently link and give particular shape to the foregoing three echelons, establishing a convincing regime of representation for water governance in Sogamoso's hydrosocial territory.
Conflicts over the Redistribution of Natural Assets and Water-related Resources
In the Sogamoso basin, the fundamental change to the river's hydrological regime has generated enormous impact. Some communities will get flooded, others will lay dry. Changes occur in water volumes and flows as a result of hydropower water storage regimes and because of release flow practices affecting downstream communities. Hidrosogamoso has also profoundly changed the river's ecological base flow regime. Consequently, fishermen and farmers have seen a dramatic loss of water and water-related resources. For many of them, this has meant a destruction of their subsistence livelihoods. Meanwhile, capital accumulation remains externally oriented.
This re-patterning of the distribution of water resources and related assets is skewed towards the new power structures in the basin. Job offerings and a myriad of socioeconomic projects proposed by the company for local residents, such as improving roads, upgrading housing, and public services (e.g., sewerage and water supply) are neatly suited to ISAGEN's own needs. They help foster acceptance of the project and benefit the establishment of settlements that are conducive to the ISAGEN's own interests. Nevertheless, these proposals are advertised as the benefits of progress and development that the river population will receive. Formulating alternative projects to compensate for the negative effects of the hydroelectric projects is mediated by environmental NGOs directly working for the company.
The Hidrosogamoso project has powerful political support from the government at all levels, which makes communities feel that they are at a strong disadvantage during negotiations. The resources promised by the company, rather than constituting tangible alternatives for livelihood development, consist of strategies to reaccommodate their territory and co-opt stakeholders. For instance, several local residents already have accepted the compensation plans offered by ISAGEN, which include indemnities, job offers, and/or land purchases. This situation is provoking divisions and conflicts within the community over access to the promised resources.
Economic and social compensations for affected groups are framed in a production/reproduction logic that is totally different from the livelihood rationalities that used to prevail in the Sogamoso basin. The ways of valuing the fundamental assets and their place within socioeconomic and cultural production systems are deeply incompatible (see also MartinezAlier 2004) . In practice, this worsens ecological-distributive conflicts. The monetary compensations, for example, are not just minimal but especially reductionist in the eyes of the local communities; they can never compensate for the social, cultural, and environmental damage generated by alterations in the river's natural dynamics.
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The Contents of Rules and Norms
From the outset, the Hidrosogamoso project has contradicted both the customary rulemaking and governance systems in the basin and the formally established rights to participation, information, and a healthy environment (see also Vos, Boelens, and Bustamante 2006) . Work was begun without respecting these rights, which are recognized in Colombia's Constitution. In fact, the environmental public hearing was held after construction had begun (Roa-Avendaño and Duarte-Abadía 2012). When Hidrosogamoso was declared to be of public interest, over 10,000 ha were expropriated from the farmers in the region. The Sogamoso events show how customary rights become invisible and come to fall outside official recognition frameworks when powerful commercial interests are at stake. ISAGEN obtained its environmental license without holding a public hearing, while large landowners and ranchers negotiated with the Company behind closed doors to get their rights claims materialized. At the same time, fishers in El Llanito (the lower Sogamoso River-Barrancabermeja), who seek to practice their customary rules and rights and maintain intergenerational ecological balance in the zone, are denied the right to regulate their wetland, unless this is approved within the project's physical planning.
Although leaders of the fishers' organization recognize the impacts that the dam will have on the river and wetlands, they do not feel they have the social force to curb the project, and therefore they have been negotiating with ISAGEN in order to survive. Fishers try to take advantage of the backing provided by Law 99, a Colombian Environmental Policy created in 1993, which obliges hydroelectric plants to finance watershed planning, fishing, and aquiculture plans. Following a pragmatic strategy, they strive to be recognized as stakeholders in the territory. However, they have not renounced the possibility of posing resistance if their expectations for negotiation do not materialize. Formally, national legislation views wetlands as collective areas for common use, where civil works cannot be built if they affect territorial livelihoods. However, in Colombia's everyday, power-laden practice, agglomeration of large properties for cattle raising, agroindustrial projects, and petroleum activities have interfered with the development of collective territoriality and the ecological regulation of Sogamoso wetlands. In this context, local fishers' negotiations with ISAGEN initially focused on curbing both the appropriation of the wetlands by large landowners and their interference in community-based management plans.
Conflicts over rules and rights, indeed, are crucial in the Sogamoso basin and reconfigure the hydrosocial network. These conflicts play out in the arena of official versus customary rulemaking frameworks but are equally important when local communities face the rules of intervening companies. The company uses its power to divide and rule, allowing some local practices while forbidding others. For example, small-scale miners working under customary rules were driven from their work areas (dry areas that are part of the riverbed) over which ISAGEN has gained formal rights. Similarly, subsistence agriculture is displaced by declaring the project's zone of influence a "public domain." This means that farmers' traditional activities are declared illegal, creating a de facto enclosure of the commons.
In the end, the practice of rulemaking and enforcement follows the laws of power in the basin. For instance, although construction of the mega-project pollutes the water and negatively impacts native fish species, the environmental license and management plans are ultimately only formalities. 6 This shows how Sogamoso's hydropower rulemaking practice increasingly aligns local, regional, and national government bodies, to the detriment of local people and the rules and rights that used to structure their livelihood practices.
Who Holds Legitimate Authority
The construction of dams such as Hidrosogamoso is an exercise in the power that dominant national and global actors hold over others, using nature as an instrument (see also McCully 2001). Here, an elite controls water and reorganizes the territory in terms of their own interests, restricting and conditioning other social groups' access. Clearly, the Sogamoso River no longer flows freely but is expropriated through a multi-scalar alliance with privileged authority. The newly introduced water governance concepts relate to formal state authority, the financial-economic power of transnationally operating companies, and scientific expert knowledge; positivistic and universalized laws are used to validate and unify the diversity of water management forms.
Over the last two decades, a powerful cluster of actors has formed to not only build the project but also make and rule the territory. This network did not replace formal government but gradually embedded national and local government in its hydrosocial network, increasingly weakening the power of diverse, local, and customary authorities. From 1973 to 1976, ISAGEN engaged the Hidroestudios-Harza engineering firm to conduct the feasibility study. Several foreign companies were involved, fostered by the investor confidence model promoted by recent governments, including Siemens from Germany which is renting machinery, Impregilo from Italy which is operating the project, and the Banco Santander from Spain which is lending to purchase machinery.
Much of the project area belonged to powerful landlords connected to para-militarism. These stakeholders negotiated directly with ISAGEN over their land use and became important network allies. Council members from local municipalities have worked to persuade others with legal land ownership to end their resistance and join in negotiations. At the same time, regional politicians have taken advantage of the company's development plans, including them as achievements of their government projects. Similarly, candidates for municipalities have negotiated their campaign funding in exchange for incorporating the development model offered by ISAGEN in their campaign platforms.
So, in most cases, the communities learn about the project directly through ISAGEN. Therefore, the Regional Government and municipalities get out of the way, no longer serving as government authorities defending their constituencies' interests but rather becoming facilitators of the intervention. Among many illustrations is the role played by public officials responsible for employment and consensus-building. When affected families and workers mobilized against the company's plans and working practices, in both cases, regional authorities assumed apparent neutrality regarding the conflict while, in fact, sustaining the Company's territorial re-patterning proposals (rather than enforcing the rights of the affected people). The alliance among political and economic powers makes social and political action by local communities difficult. In Sogamoso, this new "hydrocracy" holds powerful authority as a network of interests linking politicians, building companies, landowners, and development banks. This hydrosocial re-patterning of authority takes place within a neoliberal policy environment in which the government has stopped playing its role in supplying public services while letting the private sector manage water in the region.
Struggle over and among Discourses
In Santander, there has never been any project of the magnitude of the Sogamoso River hydroelectric construction, nor will there ever be any. A long-cherished aspiration of Santandereans for decades.
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The global energy crisis, generated both by the high costs of petroleum and by the decrease in reserves and increased energy consumption worldwide, drives expanded construction of hydroelectric mega-dams. In Colombia, discourses of energy security, competitiveness, productivity, development, and environmental sustainability further reinforce the promotion and acceptance of these projects (Roa-Avendaño and Duarte- Abadía 2012 Abadía , 2013 . Consequently, Colombia neatly follows the current international discourse that frames hydropower as a key "clean development mechanism," claiming among other benefits that reservoirs would reduce greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fuel-fired power plants (e.g. Jasanoff 2010; McCully 2001) .
Control over nature is discursively framed as progress and civilization. It is no coincidence that ISAGEN christened the dam "Tora," a Yariguie word that means "The place where man controls the river." Luis Fernando Rico-Pinzón, ISAGEN's manager, explained, "What we did was cut off the Sogamoso River, to force it through some tunnels 800 m long, to leave an 800 m stretch of river dry, to build the dam" (Gamarra and Suárez 2011) . This illustrates how the construction of dams like Hidrosogamoso is a form of conquest, an act of taming nature for the benefit of mankind. As Kaika (2006) expresses, such projects reconfigure the relationships between nature and urban spaces to fulfil the Promethean endeavor of modernization. They act as a symbol of modernity and bring foreign investment accompanied by advanced water engineering knowledge, establishing or strengthening the status quo in geopolitical relations (Boelens and Post Uiterweer 2013) . Also in Colombia, mega-hydraulic dams are seen as an infrastructure of progress, reinforcing discourses of (Western-oriented and racialized) nationhood.
The media, politicians, public institutions, and many academicians joined in presenting a view of the Hidrosogamoso project as bringing progress to an undeveloped region, where government action always had been deficient. In other words, the project theoretically addresses this past negligence through a modern, public-private collaboration, installing efficient rules and authority to order the public domain. Paradoxically, this same discourse of transforming backwardness serves to exclude local people and expropriate the assets of those who cannot negotiate in the name of development. Local communities are dispossessed of their customary rights, while Hidrosogamoso is constructed under a discourse of social welfare.
At the same time, the company positions itself in the territory as a development alternative that will bring improvements through jobs, socioeconomic projects, roads, upgraded housing, and public services such as sewers and potable water supply. Discourses of inclusion, participation, and recognition of farmers and fishers are strategically deployed to stifle opposition by local communities. ISAGEN and government agents seek legitimacy for the territorial re-patterning project through a process of social organization and including people in work commissions. So, communities' formal participation commits them to staying in the negotiation game to accept and identify with the project. However, their mandates do not allow for critical questioning of the hydropower territorial transformation itself. They can talk about the mitigation of effects and suggest adaptations that are in line with the territorial re-patterning process but cannot deviate from its basic design. The Hidrosogamoso's hydrosocial network establishes subtle mechanisms of alignment and inclusion.
The role of NGOs and local government programs is critical for legitimizing the discourses of participation and inclusion. In the Sogamoso project, ISAGEN hired an environmental NGO to mediate relations with communities regarding socioenvironmental impacts generated by the dam. The NGO, through environmental education programs, emphasizes local residents' inadequate environmental practices. Another key role is played by the Mid-Magdalena Peace and Development Program (PPDMM), funded mainly by international cooperation and Colombian companies such as Ecopetrol, ISA, and ISAGEN. The program argues, "All conflicts can be peacefully settled politically, with all parties involved, without exclusion, working for development" (Saavedra 2010:3) . References to peaceful solutions in a conflict-ridden region are discursively powerful; indeed, for decades the program has facilitated dialogues among the different stakeholders living in the area. In the Sogamoso basin, agreements follow the conditioning factors of power and are facilitated by poverty and marginalization (see also Escobar 2011). This situation leads to both paternalistic development discourses and subtle discursive forces aimed at aligning local villagers. Asymmetrical negotiations result, where the rules of play are set beforehand by the powerful players and the local population has to accept them.
Social Response of People Affected
The historical context and current sociopolitical dynamics of the zone, involving powerful geopolitical interests, armed conflict, demographic growth, and nomadic communities fleeing from the war, provide a feeble standing for the affected people to negotiate their interests and defend their livelihoods (Roa-Avendaño and Duarte- Abadía 2012) . In this region, abundant in natural bounties, the local residents have lived under harsh social conditions and inequitable distribution of resources. This situation produces feelings of "abandonment that can produce both powerlessness and rebelliousness" (Archila 2006:474) ; both factors have molded their political action in negotiations.
The people affected are small farmers, fishers, fish sellers, migrants, and small-scale miners who extract and gather gravel and sand from the river in dump trucks to sell. They are part of the population that is never recognized by the Colombian state because they have no papers, land title, or registered capital. These communities have found a place to settle on the river because of the very freedom of resources that the river makes available for them to survive. The fact that many are communities that have disintegrated during the last thirty years due to the war, together with the recent peopling of the middle basin, tends to weaken the negotiation power of the heterogeneous groups living within the territory. It requires time to achieve social cohesion and construct new collective, territorial identities in order to respond to proposed transformations. Nevertheless, in 2008 the Social Movement for Defense of the Sogamoso River 8 was formed by environmentalists, NGOs, union leaders, workers, some community leaders, and residents in the dam's impact area. The movement seeks to integrate and unify the people affected in the watershed in order to oppose the project. However, their organizational process began after the project's construction and environmental licensing was a done deal; as of 2009, much of the information was unavailable to the affected residents. This inequality in negotiations and absence of genuine consultation regarding the project has led to polarization between communities that resist the project and do not want to negotiate with the company and those who seek a supposed benefit from the project.
Through intensive dissemination, debate, and capacitybuilding, the Movement seeks to expand knowledge about the project's dimensions and its possible implications for local residents' territory and livelihoods. It aims to overcome the lack of information about the project and fight for recognition of the rights of affected people. Citizen participation mechanisms, recognized in the Constitution, are strategically used to call for public environmental hearings and to spread information about the project. This intensifies the zone's struggle for recognition of rights. The Movement brings together the diverse expressions of local residents' discontent and organizes marches and protests in the zone and mobilizations toward Bucaramanga, demanding responses from the departmental government.
So far, those negotiations have made little headway on the agreed issues. ISAGEN continues reinforcing its strategy of social reorganization through meetings, work groups, and the allocation of funds to design small, alternative development projects. The discourse and strategies of ISAGEN have successfully co-opted a number of social leaders, who complement and consolidate the dominant hydro-territorial alliance formed among the company, regional authorities, private firms, and the mass media. This situation conceals and stigmatizes the opposition to the dam, so the voices of the resistance movement have a hard time blocking the project or achieving recognition of the rights of the affected people.
Conclusions
This article demonstrates how hydropower development in the Sogamoso River Basin affects territorial resource bases, water control practices, and the broader livelihood strategies of marginalized, affected groups. It offers insights into the material and discursive practices that concretize and legitimize large-scale river water diversion and damming and analyzes the conflicts and responses that emerge from these socionatural transformation transformations.
Paradoxically, while current frameworks for integrated water governance are increasingly widespread and promote stakeholder consultation and participation around the globe, the Hidrosogamoso case illustrates how in hydropower development it is common for these same approaches to provide greater social legitimacy for large-scale water diversions and reallocations, while disregarding the underlying power dynamics that underpin marginalization. The interests, perceptions, and values held by local communities, with alternative, territory-grounded ideas on water rights, ecological dynamics, environmental problems, and in particular, locally embedded cultural understandings and meanings attached to nature and livelihood construction, are often sidelined.
Modernist policies-including Integrated Water Resources Management policies applied in concrete contextscontinue to see the environment and human societies as two separate domains of policy and action. The Sogamoso basin evidence shows, however, how in hydropower development, the production of material nature, strategic representations of nature, and forms of governance over nature, strategically and directly interrelate. Material and discursive hydropower development practices also align water resources, water technology, water users, and water governors within particular hydro-political network hierarchies.
Because of their profound impact, these large-scale water developments necessarily involve political contestation, negotiation, and struggle. Examining Sogamoso Basin interventions, we demonstrate how these water struggles happen around the water resources themselves but also how they are about the rules, norms, and laws that form the basis of water distribution and flow regulation processes, as well as about who has (or should have) the political authority and legitimacy to decide these questions. Further, contestations also occur over the discourses and knowledge used to frame or legitimize water policies and hydropower development.
This use of particular, powerful narratives that legitimize "structural violence" (Galtung 1990 ) by means of "symbolic violence" (Zizek 2009 ), means that attention to conflicts-in forms of overt and covert encounters-gets replaced by a consensual discourse in which there is little allowance for political debates about the distribution of burdens and benefits or about winners and losers. They carefully align a diversity of public and private actors at local, national, and global scales in a new Sogamoso hydrosocial network. Hidrosogamoso's cultural politics carefully direct the flows of money, people, and information in the network and secure particular regimes of representation and flows of water (cf. Zwarteveen and Boelens 2014; Rodriguez-de-Francisco and Boelens 2014) . Consequently, negotiations among the company, the government, and residents regarding construction of the Sogamoso Hydroelectric Plant began and continue under profoundly asymmetrical conditions.
The hydropower development discourses that are officially deployed, of development, sustainability, and public utility, end up declaring traditional subsistence activities (small-scale mining, fishing, agriculture) illegal. They underpin the strategies of official inclusion and recognition, which ultimately deny the locally existing body of rights and rules. Such official recognition and inclusion simultaneously illegalizes local normative and production systems that do not suit the interests and views of the new dominant hydrosocial constellation. Social participation discourse and strategies promoted by the company sought to legitimize deviating the river and damming its water, rather than generating mechanisms to construct agreements and rights to access for different stakeholders. Development projects and economic power are used to co-opt public officials, politicians, media, and social leaders, while breaking down existing social relationships. Under such conditions, as the Hidrosogamoso case makes clear, getting into the game of negotiations becomes a trap that ends up polarizing the affected communities and weakening their political efforts to defend their territory and livelihoods. Further, negotiations tend to be skewed toward just economic values: excluding ecological, social, and cultural values while undervaluing responsible human interaction with nature.
Rather than confirming and conforming to the current neutralizing, depoliticizing, and naturalizing hydropower development approaches, solutions should address underlying structures of inclusion and exclusion, water deviation, unequal access, and appropriation. Given the current state of affairs, several key issues need to be resolved through transparent and multi-actor policy decision making and concrete action that responds to the voices, needs, and opportunities of the affected communities. First, how should the socioenvironmental harm and abuses towards the local dwellers' lives and livelihoods be compensated? Second, how can the benefits and burdens of Sogamoso hydropower be equitably shared between Sogamoso Basin's families, on the one hand, and on the other, the institutions, cities, and countries that gain from diverting the river flow? And, third, given the co-optation-prone neoliberal setting and its public-private power plays, how can we guarantee and concretize the state's duties and responsibilities regarding the protection of public interests and affected people's environmental and humanitarian rights? Currently, the constitutional court has transferred the resolution of investment conflicts to international judges, entirely without discussing the corresponding hydropower environmental (in)justice issues. Therefore, in everyday reality, Sogamoso communities require effective judicial and practice-based mechanisms to defend their territorial rights. They know that they will have to mobilize a network entwining a diversity of societal actors, operating at local, national, and international scales, to challenge the economic, political, and discursive powers of the dominant hydrosocial territory network in the Sogamoso Basin. The methods included literature research, local and national archival investigation (also including newspapers, mass media, and Internet), semi-structured interviews, and group discussions with the various stakeholders affecting and being affected by changing control over the Sogamoso River's water. 3 At present, other infrastructure projects in the area include: the Ruta del Sol (highway Bogotá-Caribbean Coast), the Multimodal Port on the Magdalena River, the Train of Carare, expansion of the Refinery in Barrancabermeja, expansion of the petroleum frontier, mining extraction (coal and gold) in the Yariguies Mountains, and agroindustrial complexes, among others.
